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ABSTRACT 
 
MICHAEL BERTRAND: Building as Fundamental Ontological Structure 
(Under the direction of Thomas Hofweber) 
 
What can be said about the structural principles governing the generation of less 
fundamental constituents of the world from more fundamental ones? In particular, do many 
building relations impose this structure or is there a single relation that does this work? The 
aim of this paper is to argue that, though initially plausible, building relational pluralism is 
unable to adequately account for comparative fundamentality, suggesting that it is not up to 
the task of building the world from non-fundamental constituents. In light of this, pluralism 
seems much less plausible than it appeared. In contrast, building relation monism appeared 
highly implausible. However, a building relational hierarchy featuring a single, most 
fundamental building relation is well suited to the job of building the world from 
fundamental constituents. As a result, we ought to turn from pluralism and devote our 
attention to articulating a monistic account of the building relational structure instead.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in questions concerning the nature 
of the fundamental structure of the world. Thus, L.A. Paul asks, “what are the fundamental 
constituents of the world and how is the world built from these constituents” (Forthcoming 
b, 1)? 1  Meanwhile, Jonathan Schaffer advocates a neo-Aristotelean view of metaphysics 
according to which its aim is to uncover the substances, the “basic, ultimate, fundamental 
unit[s] of being,” on which all other things depend (2009, 351). 
 In order to answer questions concerning fundamental structure we must consider 
both the fundamental ontology and the fundamental ideology. The Fundamental ontology 
concerns what there is at the most fundamental level and how these constituents are related 
to what there is at non-fundamental levels. In contrast, the fundamental ideology concerns 
what expressions or descriptions we should take as primitive (Sider, 2012). While 
considerations of ontology and ideology are almost certainly intimately connected, my focus 
in this paper will be exclusively on fundamental ontology. 
Like Paul (Forthcoming b), Cameron (2008) and others, I take the fundamental 
constituents of the world, the proper subject of fundamental ontology, to be that which is 
metaphysically prior where that which is metaphysically prior is understood as that in which 
everything else consists2. So, I take it that fundamental ontology concerns those things from 
which all other existents are built (Paul Forthcoming b, 1). The province of fundamental 
                                                
1 Throughout, I will follow Paul and use constituent as a general term for existents in the world and so for 
inhabitants of ontological levels and building relational hierarchies. I do not mean to imply that constituents are 
related by material constitution.   
 
2 I take it that this is the traditional understanding of what it means to be a fundamental constituent. However, 
it is important to note that this understanding is distinct from the one employed by Schaffer (2010).  
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ontology properly extends beyond the constituents themselves to the structure in which 
these constituents are imbedded. This is the fundamental ontological (rather than 
ideological) structure of the world. 
One piece of this fundamental ontological structure is categorical: to what categories 
do the fundamental constituents belong? In particular, do the fundamental constituents of 
the world fall naturally into the categories of object and property? The fundamental 
categorical structure captures the way in which fundamental constituents are related to each 
other.3 However unless we are Nihilists or Monists, and I will suppose that we are not, we 
are committed to looking for more than just categorical structure.4 In addition to the 
categorical structure, we require a structure that allows us to build up the world from its 
fundamental constituents and so allows us to generate the less fundamental constituents of 
the world from more fundamental ones. Thus, we require building relations in addition to 
the fundamental constituents and the category or categories to which they belong. These 
building relations impose a kind of fundamental structure that is distinct from the categorical 
structure.  
It is an open question as to whether there are more pieces of fundamental 
ontological structure then categorical and building relational structure. For example, we may 
find that we must also countenance fundamental essential structure in order to capture 
relations of essential dependence or fundamental grounding relational structure in order to 
capture relations of metaphysical explanation. It is also an open question as to how these 
                                                
3 This categorical structure has received some interesting attention from Paul (Forthcoming b), who argues that 
all of the constituents of the fundamental level belong to the property category.  
 
4 It seems to me that my argument can be modified to impact priority monists like Schaffer (2009) as well. This 
is because, on Schaffer’s view, there is a priority hierarchy beginning at the cosmos, which is ultimately prior. 
Dependent, and so less fundamental, entities are produced by way of abstraction or un-building. As a result, the 
hierarchy posited by the monist is importantly similar to the one that the pluralist is committed to.  
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structures relate to each other and so form a world. In particular, though it may turn out to 
be the case, these structures need not be related by building. It need not be the case that the 
relationships between structures be exhaustively captured in the building relational hierarchy. 
I do not intend to venture answers to these open questions in what follows. 5  
In this paper, I am interested exclusively in the fundamental structure imposed by 
the building relations.6 What can be said about the structural principles governing the 
generation of the less fundamental constituents of the world from the more fundamental 
ones? In particular, do many building relations impose this structure or is there a single 
building relation that does the work? Building relational structure brings with it comparative 
fundamentality and the idea of ontological levels. Thus, we described the building relational 
structure as that structure that allows us to build up the less fundamental from the more 
fundamental. An adequate account of the building relational structure must also account for 
the hierarchy of comparative fundamentality that comes along with it. This is the ordering of 
constituents as more or less fundamental. In addition to its importance in fundamental 
ontology, ontological levels and comparative fundamentality are essential to important 
debates in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and more traditional metaphysics. 
In order to begin to understand building relational structure, I think we must first 
look to the ways in which what is less fundamental can be built from what is more 
                                                
5 I think that there is a difficult question concerning whether the building relation(s) can be fundamental. This 
seems to me to be analogous to a similar question about the fundamentality of the grounding relation. See for 
example Bennett (Forthcoming). At any rate, I will remain silent on this problem for the purposes of this 
paper.  
 
6 I distinguish fundamental building relational structure from non-fundamental structure of this kind because I 
think that it is likely that some building relations are reducible to or obtain in virtue of other, more fundamental 
ones. For example, it is sometimes argued that constitution ought to be analyzed in terms of composition. The 
building relational structure imposed by these relations would count as non-fundamental building relational 
structure. A multiplicity of non-fundamental building relational structure is acceptable to both the building 
relational monist and building relational pluralist as I describe them below.  
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fundamental. Many of these ways have been extensively studied and are helpfully, though 
briefly, characterized by Karen Bennett (2011). I have in mind here relations like the 
mereological notions of composition and constitution, as well as less understood notions like 
realization, micro-based determination, and emergence.  These building relations seem to 
share a core notion, which Bennett articulates in three parts. First, building is directed in the 
sense that it is irreflexive and asymmetric. These logical properties suit them to impose 
structure on the constituents, both fundamental and nonfundamental, of the world.  Second, 
the relata of building always differ from each other with regard to their fundamentality. 
Thus, building relations are relations of metaphysical priority (Bennett 2011, 14). In addition, 
there must be some sense, yet to be defined, in which the relata are connected by way of 
non-spatiotemporal overlap. 
 In spite of this shared core, there is a substantial amount of diversity among the 
building relations. For example, some building relations appear to unify by gathering 
together a multiplicity of constituents into a single whole while others seem instead to be 
determinative. In other words, building relations appear to differ significantly with regard to 
their logical profiles. While some, like composition, are many-one relations, others, like 
constitution and realization, are one-one. In addition, building relations would seem to differ 
radically with regard to their relata. While some building relations appear to operate only on 
objects (composition and constitution seem to be examples), others appear to relate only 
properties (or property instances or states of affairs). Examples include microbased 
determinism and realization.  
 These differences seem to indicate that building relations are capable of serving 
different building functions and so of imposing different pieces of the fundamental building 
relational structure. Those relations that take only properties as relata seem uniquely suited 
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to build the nonfundamental properties of the world up from their fundamental constituents 
while those relations that take only objects would seem to do a similar job with regard to 
objects. Building relations that unify construct in a way that determinative relations do not. 
Though some building relations may reduce to other, more fundamental ones, it seems 
implausible in light of their differences that every building relation can be reduced to one 
single most fundamental relation.  
In light of the different roles that they play, it seems that many building relations are 
required in order to impose the fundamental building relational structure of the world. If we 
are to build the world up from its fundamental constituents, it seems plausible that we need 
many building relations to perform the many kinds of building that are required. In other 
words, it would seem that God must have in mind multiple building relations if he is to have 
what he requires for generating the non-fundamental constituents of the world from the 
fundamental ones.7 Call this view, on which there is no single most fundamental building 
relation that alone imposes fundamental building relational structure, building relation 
pluralism.8 Conversely, building relation monism is the view according to which there is a 
single most fundamental building relation responsible for imposing the fundamental building 
relational structure. Importantly, both monism and pluralism are compatible with the 
                                                
7 Notable exceptions to this are views that begin with a one-category ontology. Paul (forthcoming a) discusses 
these. Thus, the outcome of Paul’s discussion concerning the categorical structure has important implications 
for the building structure. 
 
8 Though its endorsement is largely implicit, building relation pluralism dominates overwhelmingly in the 
literature. This is seen most clearly in the willingness of many to treat only parts of the building relational 
structure while ignoring others. This is done most commonly by restricting the domain under consideration. 
For example, Schaffer’s (2009) discussion of the building relational hierarchy is restricted only to actually 
existing concrete objects while Kim’s (1997; 1998, 80-87; 2003; 2005, 57-60) discussion of microbasing is 
restricted only to properties. This is so even though both Kim and Schaffer endorse the existence of both 
properties and objects. See Bennett (2011) for a more detailed discussion of this point.  
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existence of non-fundamental building relations and the non-fundamental structure that they 
impose.  
The aim of this paper is to argue that, though it is initially very plausible, building 
relational pluralism is afflicted with serious problems that suggest that it is not up to the task 
of building up the non-fundamental constituents of the world. Though I will not argue that 
pluralism is false, I conclude in light of the problems I identify that pluralism seems much 
less plausible than it appeared. In contrast, building relation monism appeared highly 
implausible. However, I think that a building relational hierarchy featuring a single, most 
fundamental building relation is well suited to the job of building the world from 
fundamental constituents. This is because only building relation monism seems to adequately 
account for comparative fundamentality. Because building relation monism compares so 
favorably to pluralism, I suggest that we ought to turn away from pluralism and devote our 
attention to articulating a monistic account of the building relational structure instead.  9 If I 
am right about this, then we need a single building relation that is capable of doing all of the 
assembly that we require in order to build the less fundamental from the more fundamental. 
This requirement places tight constraints on the correct account of the building relational 
hierarchy by ruling out many of those building relations that we are apt to appeal to. As a 
result, the building relational hierarchy looks much different than we might have thought. 
 I will begin by briefly presenting my preferred account of the building hierarchy, 
which has room only for a single building relation. Doing so will allow me to introduce the 
apparatus that I will make use of later in the paper. I will then canvas the possibility of an 
                                                
9 Though I will argue that there must be a single, most fundamental building relation, I will not argue that this 
most fundamental building relation is absolutely fundamental. While I tentatively endorse this position as well, 
there are difficult problems with the thought that absolutely fundamental relations impose structure as is clear 
in the debate concerning whether the grounding relation is fundamental. In particular, it would seem to follow 
that relations of this kind must take themselves as relata. While I am hopeful that problems of this kind can be 
overcome, engagement with them falls outside the scope of this paper.  
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account that, unlike mine, accords with the intuitive presumption in favor of pluralism. I will 
argue that pluralistic accounts, unlike my preferred monistic one, are unable to adequately 
account for comparative fundamentality. This is because they admit of assignments of 
comparative fundamentality that are contradictory or counter-intuitive. This is a strong 
reason for preferring a monistic account of the building relational hierarchy.  
I will begin, in section II, by introducing the assumption that the building relational 
structure is well-ordered. I will make crucial use of the well-ordering assumption in the 
arguments that follow. In section III, I will introduce what I take to be a natural account of 
comparative fundamentality in terms of rank and, assuming this account, will argue that 
there is one single hierarchy of comparative fundamentality. I conclude this section by 
presenting my preferred monistic characterization of the building relational hierarchy. I will 
then argue, in section IV, that either way of developing building relational pluralism leads to 
problematic assignments of comparative fundamentality. This is the case in virtue of very 
basic structural features shared by all pluralistic accounts. In section V, I will address the 
worry that building relational pluralism, as I have presented it, is too simple and, if made 
more sophisticated, can avoid problematic assignments. Finally, I will conclude in section VI 
that building relational pluralism ought to be set aside in favor of monism.  
2. Some Formal Considerations 
The informal discussion of the fundamental ontology that we have engaged in so far 
has made some assumptions about the building relational structure of the world and about 
the hierarchy of comparative fundamentality that accompanies it, the most contentions of 
which is that the building relational structure is well-ordered. Though I will not now defend 
this assumption, it is worth making explicit. This assumption comes in three parts. First, I 
am assuming that that the building relational hierarchy, which fixes relations of metaphysical 
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priority and comparative fundamentality, forms a strict partial ordering. This involves 
assuming that the building relations are irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. In virtue of 
their logical profile, these relations are strictly directed and so it is possible for them to 
generate the building relational hierarchy. 
It also involves the assumption that the constituents of world, all of which serve as 
the relata of building relations, form ordered sets. This means that the constituents of the 
world can be described by a set, call this set W for world, whose members include all the 
ordered pairs of constituents of the world. Each of these pairs is the potential relata of a 
building relation. Also required by the strict partial ordering is at least one binary building 
relation, R, that imposes an ordering on the set W. 10 We will say that R structures W. This 
idea of a strict partial ordering on W provides us with the formal framework that I will make 
use of below.  
Finally, well-ordering involves the assumption that each nonempty subset of the set 
W, ordered by the binary building relation(s) R, has an R-least element (Schroder 2003, 29). 
Because the ordered set W is a subset of itself, it follows that the building relational structure 
must terminate in the sense that there must be a bottom, most fundamental, level in the 
hierarchy. The occupants of this level are independent such that there is nothing that is prior 
to them and they are prior to all other entities. Well-ordering thus involves the rejection of 
metaphysical infinitism.11 Though I think that the assumptions involved in well-ordering are 
true, their soundness is still a matter of fierce debate. While I have no intention of entering 
                                                
10 Reasons why the constituents of world might not form a set include the worry that the number of the 
constituents of world might exceed the cardinality of the ordinal numbers.  
 
11 Advocates of infinitism include Morganti (2009) and Bohn (2009) while critics include Cameron (2008). 
Unfortunately, exploring the interesting debate between infinitists and foundationalists would take us outside 
the bounds of this paper.  
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this debate here, it is clear to me that its outcome will have a significant impact on the 
picture I have so far presented as well as the argument that I will give below. 
3. A First Approximation 
 Having gotten the well-ordering assumption out in the open, I want to begin by 
presenting a characterization of the relationship between the building relational hierarchy 
and the hierarchy or hierarchies of comparative fundamentality. I will argue that, in light of 
an intuitive account of comparative fundamentality, which I will assume, it follows that there 
is a single hierarchy of comparative fundamentality. I will conclude by presenting a 
characterization of the building relational hierarchy structured by a single building relation. 
Not only is this my preferred model, but we can also go on to use the apparatus required for 
its articulation in order to present the difficulties that I claim afflict building relational 
hierarchies that are structured by multiple building relations.  
 As was made clear above, I understand the fundamental constituents of the world to 
be those constituents that are ultimately prior in the sense that the fundamental constituents 
are those in which everything else consists and from which everything else is constructed. 
Constituents that meet this description are absolutely fundamental and so reside at the 
lowest ontological level. In addition to this absolute notion of fundamental, the building 
relational hierarchy brings along with it at least one (and I will later argue exactly one) 
relation of comparative fundamentality: building relations allow us to construct what is less 
fundamental from what is more fundamental. Intuitively, A is more fundamental than B if 
and only if A is closer to those constituents that are absolutely fundamental than B is. If we 
move up the building relational hierarchies beginning at what is absolutely fundamental, we 
will reach what is more fundamental before reaching what is less fundamental. Thus, if the 
building relational hierarchy brings along with it multiple hierarchies of comparative 
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fundamentality then multiple orders of closeness are brought along as well.   
 This intuitive account of comparative fundamentality is imprecise as it stands and I 
will remedy this below. Even so, I think that it is significant that, unlike absolute 
fundamentality, we cannot give a straightforward definition of comparative fundamentality 
in terms of priority as I understand it: though there may well be other ways of defining 
priority and fundamentality, the multiplicity of priority chains on the view that I have 
assumed destroys the prospects for identifying comparative fundamentality with some 
portion of the priority orderings. While it seems true, for example, that the table is less 
fundamental then the carbon atoms that compose it and so is prior to it, it seems equally 
true that the table is less fundamental than any carbon atom, even those that do not serve as 
its proper parts. This is true even though no building relations obtain. Thus constituents can 
be related by comparative fundamentality even though they are unrelated by building. 
Constituents that are equally fundamental, for example, occupy the same ontological level 
and so, though they are related by comparative fundamentality, are not apt to be related to 
each other by building. While constituents at lower levels may build objects at higher levels, 
it need not be, and is likely not, the case that every constituent at some lower level serves to 
build a given constituent at some higher level.  
 This observation brings out an important feature that seems to be shared by all 
hierarchies of comparative fundamentality: though hierarchies of comparative 
fundamentality are determined by the priority orderings imposed by building relational 
hierarchies, they cut across these building relational hierarchies and so sometimes relate 
constituents that are members of different priority chains. Intuitively, closeness to what is 
absolutely fundamental need not be restricted to members of the same priority chain. 
 As a result of this feature, we need a way of combining different building relational 
 
 
 11 
hierarchies into a given hierarchy of comparative fundamentality. This is required in order to 
define comparative fundamentality in terms of the building relational hierarchies and must 
be done whether the building relational hierarchies are structured by one relation or by 
many. At the bottom of any given hierarchy of comparative fundamentality will be those 
constituents that are absolutely fundamental. Making use of the assumption that the building 
hierarchy is well-ordered, I want to propose a very natural but more precise way of 
understanding closeness to what is absolutely fundamental, and so of understanding 
comparative fundamentality, in terms of the order theoretic notion of rank.  
 Recall our set W, which has as its members all and only the ordered pairs of 
constituents of the world. For any member of W, p, we can define the rank of p using the 
following recursive definition. Call p a minimal element of W if and only if, for all members 
of W that are related by building to p, p is prior to them in the sense that, when p is involved 
in an instance of the building relation, it is always as the left hand relatum and never as the 
right hand one.12 In other words whenever p is related by building, it is always (at least part 
of) that from which something else is built and is never built from something else. If p is a 
minimal element of W, then assign it the rank of 0. Any p with a rank of 0 is absolutely 
fundamental: it is not constructed and is among that from which all other things are built. 
Now suppose that, for some ordinal number n, the elements that have been assigned ranks 
that are less than n have already been determined. We assign rank n to p just in case p is a 
minimal element of the set R (for remainder), which has as its members all and only those 
members of W whose rank has not yet been assigned. In other words, if p is minimal with 
regard to the ordered set of members of W whose rank has not yet been settled by step n, 
                                                
12 In cases where some p is never involved in a building relation, it is trivially true that that in every instance of 
a building relation in which it is involved, it is always as the left-hand relatum. As a result, these inert p’s are 
counted as absolutely fundamental.  
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then the rank of p is n. Using this procedure, we can assign ranks to every element of W 
(Jech 2006, 25).  
 The rank of an element, defined by its location in the relevant building relational 
hierarchy, corresponds to its level of comparative fundamentality and so provides a much 
needed way of making sense of the philosophical term of art ‘levels of reality’ that plays such 
a central role in debates like those I described above. In addition, ranks can be assigned 
univocally to constituents of different building relational hierarchies and so can be used to 
define fundamentality, both absolute and comparative, in terms of this common feature. A 
constituent is absolutely fundamental, for example, if it has received a rank of 0 and so can 
be found at the bottom of a building relational hierarchy. A constituent that receives a rank 
of 25 is less fundamental than, and so is built (at least in part) from, constituents of rank 24 
but is more fundamental than, and so serves to build, constituents of rank 26. All 
constituents receiving a rank of 25 are equally fundamental even though they participate in 
different building relational hierarchies.  In other words, the rankings that constituents 
receive by way of the recursive definition, in terms of the building relational hierarchy, that I 
gave above are isomorphic to the ordering(s) of comparative fundamentality.  
 I have so far left it open as to whether there exist one or many hierarchies of 
comparative fundamentality. However, I think that the existence of multiple hierarchies is 
problematic given the natural characterization of comparative fundamentality in terms of 
rank. Assuming that this characterization is apt, I will argue that these difficulties provide 
strong reasons for rejecting pluralism about comparative fundamentality.  
Pluralism of this kind comes in two variations. As I am using the label, all pluralists 
about fundamentality are committed to the claim that there are at least two hierarchies of 
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comparative fundamentality.13 Call the pluralist with only this commitment the simple 
fundamentality pluralist. In addition, some but not all fundamentality pluralists are 
committed to the claim there are at least two discrete sets of absolutely fundamental 
constituents. Call this kind of pluralist a complex fundamentality pluralist. Neither species of 
pluralism is successful, given the natural characterization of comparative fundamentality.  
Consider first the simple pluralist account in which a multiplicity of comparative 
fundamentality hierarchies emerges from a single hierarchy of absolute fundamentality. On 
this view, there is a single cast of absolutely fundamental things. However, there are at least 
two ways in which things can differ with regard to their comparative fundamentality and so 
there are at least two dimensions of closeness along which constituents can differ. The 
problem with simple pluralism, given the natural account of comparative fundamentality, 
comes in making these notions of closeness more precise. It is difficult for me to understand 
what the simple pluralist means when she claims that there are multiple ways in which things 
can differ with regard to their comparative fundamentality.  
This is because, on the account of comparative fundamentality that I have assumed, 
the closeness of a constituent to what is absolutely fundamental is a function of its rank, 
which is assigned as a result of a recursive procedure that works by selecting minimal 
elements. As a result, it would seem that the only effective way of making clear at least two 
accounts of closeness is to endorse at least two concepts of rank and so, as minimal element 
is responsible for the assignment of rank, two concepts of minimal element. This is the only 
                                                
13 Another available pluralist position might feature multiple, discrete sets of absolutely fundamental 
constituents and only one hierarchy of comparative fundamentality. This position is not relevant to the debate 
at hand so I ignore it.  
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way to secure two hierarchies of comparative fundamentality that are genuinely distinct and 
not merely subsets of a single hierarchy.14  
The problem for the simple pluralist is that both rank and minimal element are 
clearly defined order theoretic properties and so do not seem to admit of multiple 
interpretations: I fail to see how another definition of either term would be apt. Given that 
comparative fundamentality is best understood in terms of closeness to what is absolutely 
fundamental, where closeness ought to be understood in terms of rank, the prospects for 
multiple hierarchies of comparative fundamentality seem dim. Though it is not impossible 
for such a simple pluralist account to be developed, I think that it is unlikely to be successful. 
More plausible is the complex variation of pluralism about fundamentality according 
to which there are at least two hierarchies of both absolute and comparative fundamentality. 
Strictly, this variation has been ruled out as a result of the definitions that we have given to 
our terms. This is because we have defined the absolutely fundamental constituents as those 
that are ultimately prior where that which is prior is understood as that in which everything 
else consists. In order to make room for the complex pluralist, we must engage in a subtly 
different project. As a result, the complex pluralist cannot make use of the definitions that I 
have given above. She owes us a definition either of priority or of absolute fundamentality 
such that the account admits of multiple hierarchies of absolute fundamentality. Though this 
position is similar to the one that the simple pluralist finds herself in, the prospects of 
providing these needed definitions is much more promising for the complex pluralist.  
                                                
14 This may indicate a further avenue for the objector, who might reject my assumed account and so wish to 
introduce a gap between rank assignments and assignments of comparative fundamentality. A positive account 
featuring such a gap would need to provide a function that takes ranking assignments as inputs and gives 
fundamentality assignments as outputs. It seems highly unlikely to me that a mapping function of this kind 
could be found that avoids problematic assignments of the kind that I discuss below. As a result, I’m skeptical 
of the efficacy of an objection along these lines.  
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As a result, it won’t due to rule out the complex pluralist account in light of this 
additional burden alone. Lets assume for the sake of argument that the complex pluralist is 
able to provide an account that is compatible with the existence of multiple hierarchies of 
both absolute and comparative fundamentality. Such a picture might be one in which one 
hierarchy of comparative fundamentality contains only objects while a second contains only 
properties. At the bottom of the object hierarchy might be a pool of absolutely fundamental 
objects while, at the bottom of the property hierarchy, are only fundamental properties. 
The problem that afflicts the complex pluralist is similar to the one that I will argue 
afflicts the building relation pluralists discussed below. I claim that the complex pluralist is 
forced to admit counterintuitive assignments of comparative fundamentality. The problem is 
the necessary absence of certain intuitively plausible assignments. Taking up the model in the 
paragraph above as an example, it is intuitively true that highly fundamentalproperty properties 
are more fundamental then very non-fundamentalobject objects. For example, the property of 
having a particular charge is intuitively far more fundamental then the object The United States 
Senate. Yet the complex pluralist has no resources with which to compare these constituents: 
they belong to totally discrete hierarchies of comparative fundamentality. Of course, a 
suitably revolutionary theory might supplant our intuitions concerning charge and political 
bodies such that we might be inclined to agree that charges and political bodies are not 
comparable in terms of fundamentality. The problem is not that this assignment violates 
intuitions. It is that counterintuitive assignments like the one I mentioned follow from 
complex pluralism for the wrong kind of reason: these assignments follow as a matter of 
course from very general structural features had by any complex pluralist account rather than 
as a result of specific theoretical considerations. This provides a strong reason to reject 
complex pluralism.  
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Given what I have called the natural view of comparative fundamentality, where 
comparative fundamentality is understood in terms of closeness to what is absolutely 
fundamental, it seems to me to be highly implausible that there are multiple hierarchies of 
comparative fundamentality. Though I acknowledge that there may be room for such a 
position to be developed, I am skeptical of its prospects. As a result, in what follows I will 
make extensive use of the claim that there is one unique ordering of comparative 
fundamentality. In other words, the fundamentality hierarchy is a maximal chain meaning 
that any two constituents of the world stand in a relation of comparative fundamentality 
such that one is more, less, or equally fundamental with respect to the other. 
 In light of this, my preferred monistic characterization of the building relational 
hierarchy is easily described. On this view, there is a multiplicity of building relational 
hierarchies all structured by a single most fundamental building relation. In spite of the 
building relation that all of these hierarchies have in common, it is not the case that the 
building relational structure is maximal: it is not the case that any two constituents of the 
world can be compared or related by our single building relation. In order to define 
comparative fundamentality in terms of the building relational hierarchies, we make use of 
the recursive definition of rank, which assigns to every constituent a common rank property. 
The ordering imposed by rank reflects the distance of each element from what is absolutely 
fundamental and so is identical to the ordering imposed by comparative fundamentality.  
4. What is the Problem with Pluralism? 
In the previous section, I described what I take to be a natural way in which we can 
integrate the disparate building relational hierarchies into a single hierarchy of comparative 
fundamentality. By doing so, we are able to make good on our promise of using the 
fundamental building relational structure of the world to make sense of ontological levels of 
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comparative fundamentality. The problem for pluralists, I will argue, is that they are unable 
to account for comparative fundamentality assuming the natural account of it that I have 
proposed.  
Consider, for the sake of argument, the simplest possible pluralist theory, which 
makes use of two building relations to structure the building relational hierarchy. I will 
simply call this the pluralist theory from now on. As a result of adding an additional building 
relation, the pluralist theory will involve two ordered sets instead of the single ordered set 
described by my preferred monistic account. In my monistic account, the base of the 
ordered set, the set from which the relata of the building relations are drawn, is W whose 
members include all possible ordered pairs of constituents of the world. While W may serve 
as the base in the pluralist account, it need not do so. Instead, each of the building relations 
in this account can structure a subset of W as long as the union of these subsets is equivalent 
to W. As a result, there are two ways in which the pluralist theory might be formulated 
corresponding to two kinds of bases that are available to the pluralist: both building relations 
might structure an overlapping subset of W (the limiting case of which is W itself) or each 
might structure a discrete subset of W. I will argue that, no matter which base is chosen, the 
pluralist account is afflicted with serious problems that indicate that it is not up to the task of 
building the constituents of the world. Though I will not argue that pluralism is false, I 
conclude that, in light of the problems I identify, pluralism seems much less plausible than 
we would have thought. Pluralism seems now to come out unfavorably when compared with 
monism.  
In order to see this, lets consider each of the ways that the pluralist theory might be 
formulated in turn, beginning with the theory in which both building relations structure W. 
Like my preferred monistic account, this pluralist account will feature many different 
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building relational hierarchies. However unlike my preferred account, these building 
relational hierarchies will differ with regard to what building relation is structuring them. 
Because, as I argued above, there are many different building relational hierarchies and only 
one hierarchy of comparative fundamentality, the pluralist account must include a way of 
combining these hierarchies into a single hierarchy of comparative fundamentality. As in my 
preferred account, rank can be used to do this job. Rank is assigned by a recursive function 
that works by identifying the minimal unranked elements of each building relational 
hierarchy, regardless of the building relation doing the structuring, and assigns each of these 
elements the same rank number.  
As in my monistic account, the pluralist account can then claim that the rank of an 
element corresponds to the ontological level that it occupies and so determines its 
comparative fundamentality. This move from rank to comparative fundamentality is where 
the problem with pluralism lies. The problem here is that, because rank is being determined 
by two different relations operating in tandem, contradictory or counterintuitive results can 
be reached. 
Overlapping Building Relations 
Consider the two possible ways in which the two building relations, call them B1 and 
B2, might structure W. It may be that there are constituents of W that are comparable with 
each other both by B1 and by B2. In this case, there are two building relational hierarchies in 
which these constituents are related to each other by building. Or it might be the case that 
there are no constituents that are related by both B1 and B2 such that each relation 
structures a discrete part of W. No matter how B1 and B2 behave, I think that they will 
produce problematic ranking assignments. 
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Take the case in which B1 and B2 overlap. In this case, there are some constituents 
of the world, call an arbitrary constituent of this kind p, such that p is related by both B1 and 
B2. The problem here is that there is nothing about this pluralistic hierarchy that prevents p 
from being placed on two different levels. Recall that the rank of a constituent is a function 
of its position in a particular building relational hierarchy. Because there are no resources 
available to prevent p from occupying one position in the building relational hierarchy 
structured by B1 and a second position in the building relational hierarchy structured by B2, 
there are no resources available to prevent p from being assigned two different ranks.  
This is highly problematic because we have supposed that the rank of an element like 
p corresponds to its ontological level and so determines it place in the hierarchy of 
comparative fundamentality. If p is assigned two different ranks, then p occupies two 
different levels of reality and so occupies two places in the hierarchy of comparative 
fundamentality. Yet, this is impossible. If p can be located on two different levels of reality 
and so occupies two places in the fundamentality hierarchy, it can be said that p is less 
fundamental than p and also that p is more fundamental than p. But nothing can be more or 
less fundamental than itself just as nothing can occupy another level than itself.  
In order to see this more clearly, consider an example in which B1 is replaced by 
composition and B2 is replaced by constitution. Now consider the part of W that contains a 
statue, David, and the lump of clay that it is made from, called Lump (to use a familiar 
example). What is important about David and Lump, for our purposes, is that Lump 
features in two building relational hierarchies. In the first hierarchy, in which elements are 
related as parts and wholes by material composition, Lump is at the top of a long hierarchy 
of parts: he is composed of molecules, which are composed of atoms, which are composed 
of quarks and leptons and so on. In the second hierarchy, in which elements are related by 
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constitution, Lump would seem to be located at the bottom of a short hierarchy of 
constituents: Lump constitutes David but there would seem to be nothing that constitutes 
Lump.  
Consider how the assignment of rank would go in this case. With regard to the 
hierarchy ordered by material composition, Lump is far from minimal. Though I have no 
way of knowing exactly what Lump’s rank is in this hierarchy, we can be assured that it is 
large. However, the rank that Lump is assigned with regard to the hierarchy ordered by 
constitution described above would seem to be very low. In virtue of his location at the 
bottom of this hierarchy, Lump should receive a rank of 0 and so be absolutely fundamental. 
Thus, Lump occupies two different levels of reality on this pluralist picture: He is both more 
and less fundamental than himself. So, the pluralist account produces contradictory results. 
It might, of course, be objected that constitution is not likely to be one of the building 
relations that structures the fundamental building relational hierarchy.15 While I think that 
this is likely true, this is not enough to blunt my argument. In order to show that the pluralist 
account we have considered does not admit of contradictory results, it must be shown that 
there are no cases in which two fundamental building relations disagree with regard to their 
ranking assignments and so with their assignments of comparative fundamentality. I don’t 
see how this can be done.  
Discrete Building Relations  
It might be thought that a more promising pluralist account can be formed by 
incorporating two building relations, B1 and B2, that structure discrete subsets of W rather 
than allowing B1 and B2 to overlap. On such an account, there would be no member of W, 
p, that would be related by both B1 and B2. For example, we might have one building 
                                                
15 See Paul (2006), for example, who argues that constitution should be analyzed in terms of composition. 
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relation that takes as its relata only objects and one building relation that takes as its relata 
only properties. This discrete pluralist account escapes the argument that I gave above 
because it is never the case that both relations relate the same constituents and so it is never 
the case that the same constituents are assigned two different ranks. In addition, this discrete 
account seems better to capture the intuition behind pluralism.  
Even so, another problem emerges for discrete accounts. This is because there is 
nothing to prevent those constituents that are related exclusively by B1 from involving those 
constituents that are related exclusively by B2. Although all that I need is for this to be 
possible, I think that it is also very likely, particularly if property and object are fundamental 
categories, that some of those constituents that are B1-related to each other will involve 
constituents that are B2-related. Consider, for example, the object Photon and the property 
being disposed to emit a photon under conditions C or the object Street sign and the property being a 
green street sign.  
The problem here is that there are no structural features that prevent properties that 
involve objects, like being disposed to emit a photon under conditions C, from being classed as more 
fundamental than the objects, like Photon, that they involve. After all, the features of the 
discrete pluralist account that allow it to avoid contradiction also prevent the ranking 
assignments of B1-structured hierarchies to constrain the assignments of B2-structured 
hierarchies and vice versa. However, this seems to violate our intuitions concerning what is 
more fundamental than what. Intuitively, being disposed to emit a photon under conditions C cannot 
be more fundamental then photons themselves. Photons seem prior to the property of being 
disposed to emit a photon under conditions C such that we would expect god to build photons 
before building the properties that involve photons. Because ranking assignments determine 
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comparative fundamentality, this opens the door to counterintuitive assignments of 
comparative fundamentality.  
Of course, our fundamentality intuitions are open to revision as a result of suitably 
revolutionary theoretical considerations. The problem is not that pluralist theories 
sometimes conflict with our intuitions. The problem is that these counterintuitive 
assignments are admitted for the wrong reasons. Rather than resulting from theoretical 
conditions, they occur merely as a result of abstract structural features shared by all accounts 
of a certain general kind. This ought not be the case. 
In order to see this, consider a case in which B1 is replaced by material composition 
and B2 is replaced by micro-base determinism. Now consider the part of W that includes a 
diamond, a sample of glass, the property of being disposed to scratch glass had by the 
diamond and the property of being disposed to be scratched by diamond, had by the glass. 
Two things are important about this case. First, the properties at issue make reference to 
objects. Second, it seems that there are fewer properties in the hierarchy ordered by micro-
based determinism than there are objects in the hierarchy ordered by material composition. 
We must first assume that there are no problematic assignments until the atomic 
level, on which I have chosen to begin our discussion for the sake of simplicity. Because the 
problem I identify is caused by disagreements in the number of properties and objects, 
assume that up until the atomic level there are no mismatches and so that the portions of the 
building relational hierarchies under consideration that extend below the atomic level are 
equal in length. Alternatively, imagine a world very much like ours with the exception that in 
this world, atoms and their properties are absolutely fundamental.  
Now consider the hierarchy, ordered by material composition, whose highest ranked 
constituent is the diamond.  Because diamonds have complex internal structures, it would 
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seem that the hierarchy of parts and wholes from which the diamond is built is quite long. 
At the atomic level, the diamond is composed of carbon atoms, which are parts of highly 
regular short-range structures taking the form of diamond cubics (roughly cube shaped). 
Each of these cubics serves as a part of a larger cubic that, in turn, serves as a part of an even 
larger cubic. This chain of parts and wholes terminates with the diamond.  
A similar observation can be made about the piece of glass. As an amorphous, rather 
than a crystalline, solid, the glass has less structure than the diamond. However, it too would 
seem to be at the top of an extensive hierarchy of parts and wholes. Soda glass, found in 
familiar things like windowpanes and glass bottles, is composed mostly of silicon dioxide, 
sodium carbonate, and aluminium oxide. Beginning again at the atomic level, the glass is 
composed of silicon, oxygen, sodium, carbon, and aluminum. Some of these atoms are parts 
of compounds like carbonic acid, composed of carbon and oxygen that, along some atomic 
constituents, are parts of larger compounds like silicon dioxide, sodium carbonate, and 
aluminum oxide. Because glass is an amorphous solid, it does not have the long-range 
crystalline structure of the diamond. However, it does have short and intermediate-range 
structure. Silicon dioxide, for example, behaves in a regular way as a result of its tetrahedral 
shape. These tetrahedra serve as parts of rings that, in turn, generate intermediate-range 
networks of ring structures. This chain of parts and wholes terminates with the glass.  
Having discussed the building relational hierarchies ordered by material composition 
and noted their extensive length, let’s turn now to hierarchies ordered by microbased 
determination. Look now at the building relational chain at the top of which is the property 
of being disposed to scratch glass. The sciences have given us a detailed account of how the 
hardness of the diamond results from the properties and relations of individual carbon 
atoms. Individual carbon atoms have characteristic bonding and alignment properties that 
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orient them in such a way as to form diamond cubics. As a result of having these bonding 
and alignment properties, “individual atoms have the characteristic power of causing other 
atoms to remain in a relatively constrained location even under high temperatures and 
forces” (Gillett, 2002) Because it is difficult to change the relative position of these atoms, 
the diamond is extremely hard and so has the power to scratch glass. 
 Thus, the power to scratch glass is microbased in the hardness of the diamond. The 
hardness property instantiated in the diamond is, in turn, microbased in the power of 
individual carbon atoms to constrain their neighbors. Finally, this power of individual carbon 
atoms is microbased in the bonding and alignment properties of individual atoms. It would 
seem that the building relational hierarchy that terminates at the power of the diamond to 
scratch is quite short. We can build the power to scratch glass by way of a chain containing 
only 4 members once we have agreed to ignore any structure below the atomic level.  
This difference in length between the building relational hierarchy terminating in the 
diamond’s power to scratch glass and the building relational hierarchy terminating in the 
glass produces a troubling result. To see this, consider how the assignment of rank would go 
in this case. Treating the atomic constituents as minimal in the way that we have stipulated, 
the property of being disposed to scratch glass is assigned a rank of 3 as a result of its 
position in the hierarchy ordered by microbased determinism. As a result, this scratch 
property would seem to be very fundamental. However, the piece of glass is far from 
minimal with regard to the hierarchy ordered by material composition. Above, I described 5 
layers of constituents populating the building relational chain terminating in glass. While this 
is likely to be a conservative estimate, it is sufficient for us to assign glass a rank of at least 4 
given that we are treating atomic constituents as minimal.  Because the property of being 
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disposed to scratch glass has a rank of 3 and glass has a rank of 4, the property of being 
disposed to scratch glass is more fundamental than glass itself.  
A similar account can be given for the power to be scratched by diamond, which is 
had by the glass. In the same way that the power to scratch glass comes out more 
fundamental than glass, the disposition to be scratched by diamond is more fundamental 
than the diamond.  As in the diamond case, the disposition to be scratched by diamond is 
microbased in the hardness of the glass. Hardness is, in turn, microbased in the power of 
individual atoms to rather loosely constrain the relative positions of their neighbors. This 
power is reflected in the short and intermediate-range ring structures. Finally, this power, 
had by individual atoms, to constrain neighboring atoms is microbased in the bonding and 
alignment properties of these atoms.  
As in the case of the disposition to scratch glass and the glass, the building relational 
hierarchy terminating in the disposition to be scratched by diamond receives a rank 
assignment of 3. Though I don’t know how many levels of building relational structure 
feature in the building relational hierarchy terminating in the diamond, it is certain that the 
number is far higher than 4 and so the assignment of rank given to the diamond will be 
significantly greater than 3. The disposition to be scratched by diamond is significantly more 
fundamental than the diamond itself. Using the building relational hierarchy to assign 
rankings of comparative fundamentality in the way that we have described admits of 
counterintuitive results. In addition, it doesn’t seem to me that these results depend on any 
particular facts about our choice of building relation. I think that it is possible to show that 
counterintuitive results can arise given any two building relations whose hierarchies exhibit 
the general features that I described above.  
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Though it appeared highly plausible at the outset, I have shown that building 
relational pluralism has unpalatable consequences. No matter how the pluralist chooses to 
use the building relational hierarchies to assign rankings of comparative fundamentality, 
problematic assignments are admitted. I have argues that these assignments follow in virtue 
of the common structure shared by all pluralist accounts and are independent of the 
theoretical features of any particular pluralist account. Thus, the plausibility of pluralist 
accounts in general is severely damaged. While monistic accounts appeared to be implausible 
at the outset, the ease with which they use building relational hierarchies to assign rankings 
of comparative fundamentality ought to bolster them. In light of the problems afflicting 
pluralism, it seems that pluralist accounts of the fundamental building relational hierarchy 
ought to be laid aside in favor of monistic accounts.  
5. An Important Objection 
In the previous section, I argued that building relation pluralism is highly 
problematic in any of its formulations. However, it might be objected that in doing so I have 
saddled the pluralist with an implausible commitment by requiring her to consult building 
relational hierarchies separately when assigning rank. It might be thought that a much more 
plausible pluralist account is available that allows consultation between each of the building 
relational hierarchies when assigning rankings of comparative fundamentality. This 
consultation might be thought to come by way of the extensive relations that obtain between 
building relational hierarchies and their members in such a way as to impose constraints on 
assignments in order to exclude problematic assignments of the kind above.  
 This kind of pluralist view is undeniably attractive and, if it can be made to work, 
would avoid the problems that ground my objections. However, there are good reasons for 
thinking that its prospects, also, are dim. The problem is in finding avenues by which this 
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correspondence between building relational hierarchies might occur. On the simple view that 
I described above, the level of reality that a constituent occupies is a function of its rank, 
which, in turn, is determined by the position(s) it occupies with respect to the building 
relational hierarchy or hierarchies in which it appears. Thus, there seem to be three places 
where consultation between hierarchies might get in the picture: at the assignment of levels 
of comparative fundamentality by rank, at the assignment of rank by recursive procedure, or 
at the assignment of position in the relevant building relational hierarchy. None of these is 
hospitable to consultation between building relational hierarchies.  
 Because problematic assignments enter in at the assignment of levels of comparative 
fundamentality, it is plausible to think that consultation ought to occur at this step. 
Consultation would thus be an operation on the ranks of elements and so would involve a 
rejection of my claim that the ordering imposed by the hierarchy of ranks is identical to that 
imposed by comparative fundamentality. Instead, different functions might be proposed in 
order to translate ranking assignments into unproblematic assignments of comparative 
fundamentality. For example, we might (implausibly) contend that the ranks assigned 
constituents in building relational hierarchies ordered by composition are identical to the 
comparative fundamentality of these constituents while comparative fundamentality is 
identical to the rank plus 1 of all constituents ordered by microbased determination. The 
problem with such a view is that the modifications it is capable of making are too coarse. It 
is difficult to see how the choice of a different function mapping ranks to comparative 
fundamentality is going to resolve the problematic assignments I have identified without 
causing new problems. This is because this strategy is forced to make changes to large 
numbers of assignments and not just to individual problem cases. Although such a strategy 
may be pursued, it doesn’t look promising. 
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 Locating the solution at the assignment of rank looks no more promising. 
Presumably, this would involve altering the definition of rank such that rank assignment 
proceeds in a way other than the recursive procedure I defined above. Rather than searching 
for minimal elements, such a procedure would need to weigh the complicated 
interrelationships between the hierarchies in question in order to assign rank in such a way as 
to avoid problematic assignments of comparative fundamentality.  
 As in the intervention on assignments of comparative fundamentality, it seems 
unlikely that such a procedure could be defined: this strategy is very coarse grained and so is 
unlikely to resolve problematic assignments without producing new ones. Even if such a 
definition can be given, rank is an order theoretic property of constituents of partially 
ordered sets and does not appear to admit of multiple definitions. As a result, a procedure of 
this kind would not be a new strategy for the assignment of rank. Instead, it would be an 
altogether new account of the connection between building relational hierarchies and 
comparative fundamentality. This amounts to a rejection of the natural account of 
comparative fundamentality that I have assumed. Though I see no reason for thinking that a 
new account is unavailable to the pluralist who wishes to deny this assumption, the burden is 
on her to articulate this account and demonstrate its superiority to the account that I have 
advocated.  
 Finally, it might be thought that consultation ought to occur at the building level and 
so play a role in determining the positions a constituent takes in the building relational 
hierarchy (or hierarchies) in which it occurs. On this view, what builds what is not a local 
matter concerning a single building relation and its relata. Instead, it is a complex matter 
involving the relationships that obtain between constituents located in different building 
relational hierarchies, for example objects and their properties, or even between whole 
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building relational hierarchies, like property hierarchies and object hierarchies. It would seem 
that, to say that the table is built from the table leg, it is not enough to know that the table 
leg is part of the table. We must also know about the relationships that obtain between the 
table, its parts, and the properties that inhere in them or between the hierarchies that 
contains the table and table leg and other hierarchies like those concerning the construction 
of the table’s properties.   
The problem with this strategy is that the account of building that it requires seems 
to be at odds with how building works. In order to know that the table is built from its parts, 
I need not take into account the relationship between the table and any other constituents of 
the world or so the pervasive mereological story goes. In addition, building seems only to be 
a relationship between constituents and has little to do with higher order relationships that 
obtain between larger building relational structures. After all, building relational hierarchies 
as I have defined them, are results of the ordering imposed by the instantiation of building 
relations taking constituents of the world as relata. It will not do to have these hierarchies 
determine the relations of building that they, in turn, depend on. It would seem that this 
strategy, though it may resolve problematic assignments of comparative fundamentality, 
involves commitment to an implausible account of building. Though the pluralist might 
accept this implication by revising our understanding of building and building relational 
hierarchies, it comes at the high price of revising our accounts of many well-understood 
building relations.   
 Though it might be thought that a more sophisticated account of building relational 
pluralism can resolve the problems that I have raised by allowing for consultation between 
different building relational hierarchies or their constituents, I have argued that any way of 
developing this account is problematic. My simple account of building relational pluralism 
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has three parts, each of which might be amended or intervened upon in order to allow for 
consultation. Yet, intervention on any of these parts is problematic. 
6. Conclusion 
Though it appeared highly plausible at the outset, I have argued that building 
relational pluralism has unpalatable consequences. Given the plausible account of 
comparative fundamentality that I have assumed, it follows that there is a single hierarchy of 
comparative fundamentality. It would seem that no matter how the pluralist chooses to use 
the building relational hierarchies to assign rankings of comparative fundamentality, 
problematic assignments are admitted. I have argues that these assignments follow in virtue 
of the common structure shared by all pluralist accounts and are independent of the 
theoretical features of any particular pluralist account. Thus, the plausibility of pluralist 
accounts in general is severely damaged. Though it might be objected that a more 
complicated pluralist account capable of avoiding these problems might be given, I have 
argued that any way of developing such an account will be afflicted with further problems. A 
more sophisticated account is not impossible but its prospects for development do not seem 
promising.  
While monistic accounts appeared to be implausible at the outset, the ease with 
which they use building relational hierarchies to assign rankings of comparative 
fundamentality ought to bolster them. In light of the problems afflicting pluralism, it seems 
that pluralist accounts of the fundamental building relational hierarchy ought to be laid aside 
in favor of monistic accounts. As a result, it seems to me that future development of the 
project of fundamental ontology ought to proceed along monistic lines when articulating the 
fundamental building relational structure of the world. 
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